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FIGHTING FOR MARKET SHARE: HOW A TRADE-AT RULE 
CAN IMPROVE MARKET EFFICIENCY
MARIA ZYSKIND
INTRODUCTION
The opening bell rang at 9:30 AM, signaling the start of the trad-
ing day on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1980.1 Thou-
sands of traders congregated on the floor, sending an unbridled 
energy through the air.2 Equipped with pen and paper, they shouted, 
jostled, and gesticulated as they bargained for prices.3 They traded 
stock in face-to-face transactions, providing a human element to the 
market.4
Fast forward a few decades and trading floors have subdued.5
Computers have largely replaced boisterous crowds of floor traders 
and automation has decreased human interaction.6 Moreover, new 
technology has allowed market participants to trade shares of stock 
in milliseconds.7 Accordingly, computer algorithms dominate the 
market, entering and canceling thousands of orders per second.8
This transformation has taken a heavy toll on exchanges’ mar-
ket share. Gone are the days where exchanges served as the pri-
mary marketplaces for order execution.9 About eighty percent of 
stock trading occurred on the NYSE ten years ago, but only twenty 
1. D.M. Levine, A Day in the Quiet Life of a NYSE Floor Trader, FORTUNE (May 29, 
2013, 2:15 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/05/29/a-day-in-the-quiet-life-of-a-nyse-floor-trader/.
2. Id. 
3. Id.
4. Edwin Batista, Note, A Shot in the Dark: An Analysis of the SEC’s Response to the
Rise of Dark Pools, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 83, 87 (2014).
5. Levine, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Summary of Senate PSI Hearing on Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, 
and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock Markets, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASSOC. (June 17, 
2014), http://www.sifma.org/members/hearings.aspx?id=8589949563 [hereinafter Senate PSI 
Hearing].
8. AL BROOKS, TRADING PRICE ACTION TRENDS: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF PRICE CHARTS
BAR BY BAR FOR THE SERIOUS TRADER (2d ed. 2012).
9. See Jennifer Dean, Note, Paradigm Shifts & Unintended Consequences: The Death 
of the Specialist, the Rise of High Frequency Trading, & the Problem of Duty-Free Liquidity in 
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percent occurred there in 2014.10 Instead of exchanges, many or-
ders now execute on off-exchange venues, which are known as 
alternative trading systems (ATSs). ATSs function like exchanges by 
matching buyers and sellers to facilitate order execution, but they 
can offer price improvement, anonymity, faster execution, and de-
creased trading costs to investors.11
New technology and regulatory changes have significantly in-
creased the prevalence of off-exchange trading, which poses distinct 
problems to investors. About forty percent of stock trading occurred 
on off-exchange venues in 2014.12 This number includes nearly all 
of the orders that mom and pop investors send their brokers.13 Most 
of these individuals do not know where their orders execute or 
whether they receive the best execution. On one hand, brokers can 
route orders to off-exchange trading venues that offer investors price 
improvement and decreased trading costs.14 On the other hand, 
brokers can route orders to venues that offer themselves the highest 
rebates.
Unlike many mom and pop investors, exchanges are painfully 
aware of the consequences associated with off-exchange trading. 
Indeed, off-exchange trading has cut into the profit and market share 
of exchanges. As a result, major exchanges like Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE), NYSE15, and Nasdaq are pushing to overhaul the 
stock market and decrease off-exchange trading. All three have pub-
licly voiced support for a trade-at rule.16 While the details of a trade-
at rule vary depending on the proposal, the aim of the trade-at rule is 
10. Eric Garcia, This NYSE Plan Could Help Retail Investors, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 24, 
2013, 12:08 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-nyse-plan-could-help-retail-
investors-2014-12-24.
11. See Dean, supra note 9, at 234–35. 
12. John McCrank, Dark Markets may be More Harmful than High-Frequency Trading,
REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014, 4:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/07/us-markets-
darkpools-analysis-idUSBREA3605M20140407.
13. Sarah Lynch & John McCrank, Exclusive: SEC Eyes Test that May Lead to Shift 
Away from ‘Dark Pools’, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2014, 5:35 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/us-sec-darkmarkets-idUSBREA3A0CP20140411.
14. Dean, supra note 9, at 235.
15. ICE closed on its acquisition of NYSE’s parent company, NYSE Euronext, in Novem-
ber 2013. ICE Closes on $11B Acquisition of NYSE Euronext, YAHOO FIN. (Nov. 13, 2013, 
11:57 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/ice-closes-11b-acquisition-nyse-
135835485.html?nf=1&bypass=true. 
16. Dave Michaels, Exchanges Get Test to Curb Dark Trading in SEC Program,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 24, 2014, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-
24/exchanges-get-test-to-curb-dark-trading-in-sec-program.html; Bradley Hope, NYSE, 
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to decrease off-exchange trading.17 In practice, a trade-at rule has 
the potential to force brokers to send more orders to exchanges and 
push market share away from off-exchange venues.18
This paper analyzes the effects of off-exchange trading and the 
implementation of a trade-at rule as a remedy for the consequences 
associated with off-exchange trading. Section I analyzes the history 
behind the increase in off-exchange trading, focusing on the techno-
logical and regulatory changes that gave rise to the current frag-
mented market structure. It also evaluates the benefits and 
consequences of off-exchange trading by analyzing its effect on 
transaction costs, bid-ask spreads, liquidity, and price. Moreover, it 
is necessary to understand the current proposals addressing off-
exchange trading and the stakeholders behind each proposal. Sec-
tion II discusses proposals by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), ICE, Nasdaq, and BATS Global Markets (BATS) that 
include a trade-at rule, decrease in access fees, block trading ex-
emption, or elimination of the maker-taker system. As a solution to 
the increase of off-exchange trading, Section III argues for a pro-
gram that incorporates a trade-at rule, a decreased cap on access 
fees, a variable access fee and rebate schedule, and a block trading 
exemption. Of note, empirical evidence is the best measure of suc-
cess for any program. Therefore, Section IV discusses metrics to 
use in evaluating the success of any such initiative. This article sug-
gests evaluating market share, bid-ask spreads, and price to deter-
mine whether the current market structure is more efficient with a 
trade-at rule.
I. THE RISE OF OFF-EXCHANGE TRADING
The last several decades have seen the transformation from an
exchange-dominated market to a fragmented market where trading 
is dispersed among various locales. In determining the need for a 
trade-at rule, it is necessary to understand the technology and regu-
lations that spurred off-exchange trading and the impact of off-
exchange trading on the market.
17. See ROBERT P. BARTLETT & JUSTIN MCCRARY, DARK TRADING AT THE MIDPOINT:
PRICING RULES, ORDER FLOW AND PRICE DISCOVERY 4 (2015); Amy Kwan, Orchestral Manoeu-
vres in the Dark, 35 AUTOMATED TRADER MAGAZINE 34, 36 (2015).  
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A. Technology and Changing Regulations
Before computers dominated the stock market, humans traded 
stock on exchange floors in face-to-face transactions.19 To trade on 
the floor, buyers and sellers purchased seats and become exchange 
members.20 A market maker—a type of exchange member—served 
as an intermediary between an exchange and the public.21 Market 
makers executed orders for investors and profited from the differ-
ence in the price they paid for a stock and the price they charged to 
process investor orders.22
The need for human intermediaries diminished as computers 
decreased in cost and computer-based trading increased in popular-
ity in the 1990s.23 Namely, electronic communications networks 
(ECNs) gained market share in the 1990s.24 An ECN is a type of 
ATS that matches buyers and sellers with computer algorithms and
allows firms to execute trades without intermediaries.25 An ECN al-
lows subscribers to place trades directly on its platform.26 It posts 
orders for subscribers to view and automatically submits matching 
orders for execution.27 ECNs can be more attractive than exchanges 
because they offer lower fees, faster trade execution, and rebates 
for providing liquidity.28 As ECNs gained popularity, they chipped 
away at exchanges’ dominance of the market.
In 1999, the SEC passed Regulation Alternative Trading Sys-
tems (Reg ATS), making the marketplace more favorable towards 
ATSs.29 Reg ATS allowed ATSs to register as broker-dealers in-
stead of exchanges, which are considerably more expensive to cre-
ate and are subject to stricter regulation than broker-dealers.30
19. Batista, supra note 4, at 87.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 87–88.
23. Id. at 88.
24. Nathan D. Brown, Note, The Rise of High Frequency Trading: The Role Algorithms 
and the Lack of Regulations, Play in Today’s Stock Market, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 209, 211 
(2012).
25. Batista, supra note 4, at 88–89.
26. ECNs/Alternative Trading Systems, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrecn.shtml (last modified Nov. 4, 2005).
27. Id.
28. Ian Poirier, Note, High-Frequency Trading and the Flash Crash: Structural Weak-
nesses in the Securities Markets and Proposed Regulatory Responses, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
445, 449–50 (2012).
29. Dean, supra note 9, at 234. 
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Accordingly, Reg ATS was a major victory for ATSs by allowing 
them to carry out traditional exchange functions with less expense 
and regulation.31 Due to automation and Reg ATS, the market had 
an alternative to exchange-based trading and, as a result, exchang-
es no longer served as the most attractive execution venues.
This use of automation and computer algorithms to match or-
ders in ATSs gradually evolved into high-frequency trading (HFT).32
HFT involves running complex computer algorithms to electronically 
buy and sell large amounts of securities at high speeds.33 In 2001, 
the SEC moved to decimalization in the stock market, inadvertently 
encouraging HFT. Decimalization meant that stock exchanges had 
to price stocks in pennies rather than fractions. Before decimaliza-
tion, the minimum price change between shares of stock was 1/8th of 
a dollar, so a share of stock could be priced at “$129, $129.125, 
$129.25 and so on.”34
The move to decimalization narrowed bid-ask spreads, limiting 
the ability of market makers to compete.35 Market makers continual-
ly buy and sell securities, aiming to profit off the bid-ask spread, 
which is the difference between the price a seller will accept and the 
buyer will pay. Because decimalization decreased spreads from 
fractions of a dollar to a penny, the minimum profit that a market 
maker could make off a trade decreased.36 To make the same 
amount of money, market makers had to trade significantly more 
stock.37 Unlike market makers, high-frequency traders rapidly exe-
cuted thousands of orders with the use of high speed algorithms, 
reaping profits off penny spreads.38 Thus, decimalization encour-
aged high-frequency traders at the cost of market makers.39
31. Id. 
32. Batista, supra note 4, at 89.
33. Matthew Philips, High-Frequency Trading’s Rise and Rise, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 4, 
2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-12-04/high-frequency-tradings-rise-and-rise.
34. Kambiz Foroohar, Trading Pennies Into $7 Billion Drives High-Frequency’s Cowboys,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-10-06/trading-
pennies-into-7-billion-profit-drives-high-frequency-s-new-cowboys.
35. Michael McGowan, Note, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use 
and Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, ¶12 (2010).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Jerry Adler, Raging Bulls: How Wall Street Got Addicted to Light-Speed Trading,
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HFT presented problems for institutional investors, who trade 
large amounts of securities at a time. Namely, high-frequency trad-
ers used computer programs to detect patterns signaling a large 
trade.40 Before institutional investors could complete their trades,
high-frequency traders executed their own orders in front of the insti-
tutional investors’ orders.41 This strategy known as front-running 
moved the price in favor of high-frequency traders and against insti-
tutional investors by making a buy order more expensive and a sell 
order less profitable for institutional investors.42
In 2005, the SEC adopted Regulation National Market System 
(Reg NMS), which again increased the popularity of ATSs and de-
creased institutional investors’ ability to hide from high-frequency 
traders.43 Reg NMS aimed to connect various trading venues into a 
linked trading network, or a national market system.44 It required 
exchanges to route orders to the trading venue with the best dis-
played price, regardless of the venue where the order was filed.45
Reg NMS decreased exchanges’ stronghold over the market by 
ensuring that orders were routed to the venue with the best dis-
played price, which was not necessarily an exchange.46 Before Reg 
NMS, the NYSE’s market share was about eighty-five percent; how-
ever, after Reg NMS, the NYSE’s market share plummeted to 
around thirty percent.47
In addition to order-routing requirements, Reg NMS implement-
ed certain disclosure requirements that limited institutional investors’ 
ability to hide from HFT. Before Reg NMS, to avoid front-running by 
high-frequency traders, institutional investors disclosed the full 
scope of their trades at the last minute.48 They engaged in block 
trading, arranging “secret” trades where details were revealed after 
order placement.49 However, Reg NMS required exchanges “to col-
lect and publish the quotations for the securities posted in their ven-
40. Batista, supra note 4, at 84 . 
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43739, DARK
POOLS IN EQUITY TRADING: POLICY CONCERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2014).
44. Poirier, supra note 28, at 449.
45. Id.
46. Craig Pirrong, Financial Exchanges: Competition and Vertical Integration in Financial 
Exchanges, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 90, 94 (2011). 
47. Id.
48. Batista, supra note 4, at 90.
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ues . . . [and] forced all trading venues to monitor stock prices con-
stantly on an electronic ticker tape.”50 These disclosure require-
ments decreased the ability of institutional investors to hide from 
high-frequency traders who jumped in front of their orders, effective-
ly increasing the price of buy orders and decreasing the price of sell 
orders.51
As a result, institutional investors sought shelter from front-
running in dark pools. A dark pool is another type of ATS that 
matches orders without publishing pre-trade bids and offers. Dark 
pools publicize price information after a trade is completed.52 A
loophole in Reg ATS propelled dark pools to popularity in the latter 
half of the 2000s.53 The loophole “allowed trading with hidden 
quotes as long as the volume of trades on a stock did not exceed 
five percent of the national trading volume in that stock.”54 As a re-
sult, investors could use dark pools to trade large blocks of securi-
ties anonymously and avoid alerting high-frequency traders of their 
actions.55 Thus, exchanges lost market share to ATSs, as more in-
vestors chose dark pools for order execution.56
The combination of technological advancements, Reg ATS, 
decimalization, and Reg NMS led to the rise of ATSs and off-
exchange trading.57 For instance, forty percent of stock trading in 
the United States took place in off-exchange venues in 2014, a large 
increase from sixteen percent in 2008.58 Today, when executing 
orders, investors can choose from several ECNs, more than forty 
dark pools, and thirteen exchanges.59 The dominance of exchanges 
has fallen because trading is dispersed across various venues. 
About eighty percent of stock trading occurred on the NYSE ten 
years ago but only twenty percent occurred there in 2014.60 Current-
50. Id. at 91. 
51. GARY SHORTER & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43739, DARK POOLS IN
EQUITY TRADING: POLICY CONCERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2014).
51. Batista, supra note 4, at 84.
52. Id.
53. Batista, supra note 4, at 92–93.
54. Id. at 92.
55. SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 51. 
56. See id. at 1.
57. Dean, supra note 9, at 235. 
58. John McCrank, Dark Markets may be More Harmful than High-Frequency Trading,
REUTERS (Apr. 7, 2014, 4:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/07/us-markets-
darkpools-analysis-idUSBREA3605M20140407.
59. BLACKROCK, US EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE: AN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 2 (2014).
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ly, no exchange has a stronghold on the stock market.61 About twen-
ty percent of stock trading occurs on the NYSE, Nasdaq, and BATS, 
respectively.62
Finally, in 2010, the SEC sought comment on a trade-at rule 
aimed at shifting trading back to exchanges.63 The proposal sparked 
considerable commentary among the industry and the SEC ultimate-
ly did not implement the rule.64 However, the trade-at rule is again 
up for discussion as the SEC and ICE have incorporated trade-at 
rules into proposals for stock market reform. The SEC incorporated 
a trade-at rule as part of its study on trading increments.65 Mean-
while, ICE proposed a trade-at rule in combination with decreased 
access fees to drive orders back to exchanges.66 Although Bloom-
berg and Reuters have cited Nasdaq as a proponent of a trade-at 
rule, Nasdaq has its own proposal to minimize off-exchange trad-
ing.67 Its proposal uses decreased access fees to move trading back 
to exchanges without a trade-at rule.68
B. Off-Exchange Trading and Market Quality
Naturally, the market participants that a trade-at rule benefits 
tend to voice support in its favor. Meanwhile, those disadvantaged 
by a trade-at rule tend to voice opposition. Since exchanges have 
lost market share to off-exchange venues, it is no surprise that ICE, 
61. Bradley Hope, BATS Opposes NYSE Owner’s Stock-Market Reform Plan, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 18, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bats-opposes-nyse-owners-stock-
market-reform-plan-1418933375.
62. Id.
63. Thoughts On Trade-At Rule, THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://blog.themistrading.com/thoughts-on-trade-at-rule/. 
64. Nina Mehta, Morgan Stanley Changing Dark Pool to Attract Bigger Orders,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 21, 2011, 5:48 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-
09-21/morgan-stanley-changing-dark-pool-rules-in-attempt-to-increase-order-sizes.
65. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PLAN TO IMPLEMENT A TICK SIZE PILOT PROGRAM
SUBMITTED TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO RULE 608 OF
REGULATION NMS UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 15–16 (2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/tick-size-pilot-plan-final.pdf.
66. Larry Tabb, The Grand Bargain: A Great Start, But Don’t Hold Your Breath,
TABBFORUM (Jan. 6, 2015), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/the-grand-bargain-a-great-start-but-
don’t-hold-your-breath; Bradley Hope & Scott Patterson, NYSE Plan Would Revamp Trading,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2014, 8:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/intercontinental-exchange-
proposing-major-stock-market-overhaul-1418844900.
67. Lynch & McCrank, supra note 13; Michaels, supra note 16.
68. Here Is What You Need to Know About The Nasdaq Experimental Pricing Schedule,
THEMIS TRADING BLOG (Feb. 2, 2015), http://blog.themistrading.com/here-is-what-you-need-to-
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NYSE, and Nasdaq have voiced support for a trade-at rule.69 In con-
trast, brokers associated with ATSs are generally opposed to a 
trade-at rule because it forces orders away from them and cuts into 
profits.70 Therefore, it is essential to understand the effect of off-
exchange trading on the market to come to an objective conclusion 
on the utility of a trade-at rule. This section discusses the effect of 
off-exchange trading on transaction costs, bid-ask spreads, liquidity, 
and price.
1. Transaction Costs
Off-exchange trading has benefited the market by decreasing 
transaction costs; however, it has increased the conflicts of interest 
that brokers face when choosing execution venues. First, decreased 
transaction costs benefit investors. Transaction costs are the ex-
penses associated with buying or selling securities.71 Examples in-
clude commissions paid to brokers or the difference between the 
price to buy and sell.72 Further, because many exchanges employ a 
maker-taker system, ATSs can serve as less expensive execution 
venues for brokers.73 In a maker-taker system, market participants 
that respond to buy or sell orders are “takers” of liquidity and pay a 
fee to access the liquidity on exchanges.74 In contrast, market partic-
ipants that add liquidity, or post orders that are not immediately exe-
cutable, are “makers” of liquidity and receive rebates.75 Access fees 
and rebates can serve as incentives for brokers to send orders to 
less expensive, non-exchange venues.
Accordingly, off-exchange venues serve a valuable role in de-
creasing the cost of trading by allowing brokers to avoid exchanges’ 
69. Lynch & McCrank, supra note 13; Michaels, supra note 16. 
70. Matt Levine, Levine on Wall Street: Rigging FX and Defining Insider Trading,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 11, 2014, 7:53 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-11-
11/levine-on-wall-street-rigging-fx-and-defining-insider-trading.
71. Anya Aratovskaya, How Forex Traders Can Account for Unexpected Costs, BOS.
TECH. BLOG (June 12, 2013), http://www.bostontechnologies.com/blog/How-Forex-Traders-
Can-Account-For-Unexpected-Costs.
72. JAROSLAW MORAWSKI, INVESTMENT DECISIONS ON ILLIQUID ASSETS 48 (1st ed. 2008).
73. Gary Stone, The Maker-Taker Model and Access Fees: It’s Time for the SEC to 
Correct the Prisoner’s Dilemma, BLOOMBERG: EQUITIES (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.bloombergtradebook.com/blog/maker-taker-access-fees/.
74. Id.
75. Id.; Bob Pisani, Wall Street Trade Group Urges New Trading Rules, CNBC (July 14, 
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access fees.76 To avoid these fees, brokers can send orders to ven-
ues like ECNs or dark pools.77 They can also fill orders from the 
brokerage firm’s own inventory, a process called internalization.78
Moreover, brokers can sell the orders they receive from investors to 
wholesale brokers in a process called payment for order flow.79
Many wholesale brokers in turn internalize or route the orders else-
where for execution, often to an ATS.80
On the other hand, the execution quality of investor orders can 
be impaired when brokers face conflicts of interest in choosing be-
tween the multitude of off-exchange venues.81 Access fees, rebates, 
internalization, and payment for order flow incentivize brokers to 
preference their own financial interest above the customers’ inter-
est.82 For example, a broker may choose a specific trading venue for 
order execution because it offers higher rebates, even though an 
exchange would offer the customer better execution quality.83 In 
terms of execution quality, the broker’s choice in venue may influ-
ence execution speed and the number of shares that receive price 
improvement.
Although brokers have a duty of best execution to their custom-
ers, it is not strong enough to prevent conflicts of interest. The duty 
of best execution is a “loose, imprecise, principles-based standard 
that is designed to offer flexibility, with a certain degree of subjectivi-
ty for the broker.”84 In considering best execution, brokers consider 
factors such as price, order size, execution speed, and certainty of 
execution.85 However, recent case law does not reflect these factors 
and, instead, revolves around obvious and continual violations of the 
76. CHARTERED FIN. ANALYSTS INST., TRADE-AT RULES IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA: A MIXED 
BAG FOR INVESTORS 1 (2014), 
https://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/Documents/Policy%20Brief_Trade-at%20Rules.pdf.
77. Dave Michaels, NYSE Proposes Lower Access Fees to get More Trading,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 13, 2013, 8:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-
13/nyse-proposes-lower-access-fees-to-get-more-trading-on-exchanges.
78. Market Centers: Buying and Selling Stock, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/market.htm (last modified Oct. 15, 2012). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Senate PSI Hearing, supra note 7, at 1.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2.
84. MICAH HAUPTMAN, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., WHITE PAPER: TOWARD A U.S. EQUITY 
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duty of best execution.86 Customers are hurt when brokers favor 
their own interest, as customer orders can experience a lower prob-
ability of being filled and an overall decrease in execution quality.87
2. Bid-Ask Spreads
There is no consensus on the impact that off-exchange trading 
has on bid-ask spreads as different studies yield conflicting results. 
Nevertheless, investors prefer narrower bid-ask spreads, meaning 
the difference between the price at which the seller will sell and the 
buyer will buy is minimal.88 With narrow spreads, the buyer and sell-
er will generally agree on what the correct price of a stock should 
be.89 However, where spreads are wide, costs are greater because 
a buyer or seller must concede more to enter or exit a trade.
Certain empirical evidence shows a correlation between dark 
trading and wider bid-ask spreads. A 2011 study by Rutgers Univer-
sity Professor Daniel Weaver examined trading in over 4,000 stocks 
and found a correlation between trading in dark pools and wider bid-
ask spreads.90 Weaver conducted another study in 2014 examining 
trade data from dark pools, ECNs, and broker-dealer internalizers.91
The study similarly found that off-exchange trading is associated 
with wider spreads.92
On the other hand, in 2012, a CFA Institute study concluded 
that varying amounts of dark trading, based on market capitalization, 
can narrow bid-ask spreads.93 Although there is a point at which 
trading in dark venues widens bid-ask spreads,94 SEC Chair Mary 
Jo White publicly stated that “spreads between bid and ask prices 
for the broader market . . . are as narrow as they have ever been.”95
86. Id.
87. Senate PSI Hearing, supra note 7, at 2.
88. See Morningstar Investing Glossary: Bid-Ask Spread, MORNINGSTAR,
http://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/bid-ask-spread.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
89. Id.
90. STAFF OF THE DIV. OF TRADING & MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EQUITY MARKET 
STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW PART I: MARKET FRAGMENTATION 11 (2013).




95. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Sandler O’Neill
& Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference, Enhancing Our Equity Market 
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Thus, whether off-exchange trading has negatively impacted bid-ask 
spreads remains an open question.
3. Liquidity
By taking displayed liquidity away from exchanges, off-
exchange trading has the potential to impair the price discovery pro-
cess and even cause inaccurate stock prices. The price discovery 
process is a method of determining stock prices based on supply 
and demand.96 Publicly posted bids and offers contribute to price 
discovery because they express the market’s interest in a stock. 
Accordingly, when significant amounts of trading occur on dark trad-
ing venues that do not publicize pre-trade information, publicly post-
ed prices may not be an accurate measure of the market’s 
interest.97 Investors, thus, may not receive the best price possible.98
Further, instead of aiding in the price discovery process, dark mar-
kets copy the prices set by exchanges; however, these prices may 
not be an accurate measure of supply and demand.99
4. Price
Off-exchange trading venues can benefit investors by offering 
better prices and providing a haven from high-frequency traders. 
Although ATSs can offer improved prices, such price improvement 
may not be large.100 For instance, if the best price listed on an ex-
change is $20, an ATS can offer $20.0001, an improvement of 
$0.0001.101 Such a price improvement results in minimal savings to 
investors. Nevertheless, ATSs argue that any price improvement, no 
matter how small, benefits investors.102
Dark pools also provide institutional investors an escape from 
high-frequency traders, who can move stock prices against institu-
96. BLACKROCK, ETFS HELP IMPROVE MARKET STABILITY: A CLOSER LOOK AT FIXED 
INCOME ETF BEHAVIOR DURING RECENT BOND MARKET MOVEMENT 4 (2014),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/literature/whitepaper/etfs-help-improve-market-
stability-october-2014.pdf.
97. ANA AVRAMOVIC, CREDIT SUISSE, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE DARK? TRADING OFF-
EXCHANGE 1 (2012).
98. Lynch & McCrank, supra note 13.
99. Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulato-
ry and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition, 2002 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 399, 419 (2002).
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tional investors by front-running their orders. By publicizing price 
information after the completion of a trade, dark pools minimize in-
formation leakage, hindering the ability of high-frequency traders to 
detect large orders right before their submission.103 However, high-
frequency traders frequent some dark pools, front-running orders 
and increasing the cost of trading for investors.104
II. TRADE-AT RULE
Regulators and exchanges have proposed different programs to 
address the increase in off-exchange trading. The SEC’s Tick Size 
Pilot Program subjects a group of securities to the trade-at rule.105
ICE’s “grand bargain” proposes a combination of a trade-at rule with 
a decrease in access fees.106 Nasdaq’s proposal, on the other hand, 
tests a decrease in access fees without a trade-at rule.107 To evalu-
ate the merits, it is important to understand the stakeholders that 
support and oppose each program. Therefore, this section discuss-
es the SEC’s Tick Size Pilot Program, ICE’s “grand bargain,” and 
Nasdaq’s program. This section also contemplates the current mar-
ket structure without a trade-at rule. Finally, this section evaluates 
the impact of the trade-at rule in Canada and Australia’s markets.
A. Tick Size Pilot Program
On June 24, 2014, the SEC ordered a group of exchanges108
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) to de-
103. Market Structure: Ensuring Orderly, Efficient, Innovative and Competitive Markets for 
Issuers and Investors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises, of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 112th Cong. 15 (2012) (statement of 
Duncan Niederauer, Chief Exec. Officer, NYSE Euronext).
104. Jim Edwards, How Knowledge of Credit Suisse’s Dark Pool for High-Frequency 
Trading Leaked Out on LinkedIn, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2014, 1:11 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/credit-suisses-dark-pool-for-high-frequency-trading-leaked-
on-linkedin-2014-4. 
105. Supriya Kurane, SEC Asks Exchanges, FINRA to Submit “Tick Size” Pilot Plan,
REUTERS (June 25, 2014, 3:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/25/sec-
pilotprogram-trading-idUSL4N0P61HV20140625.
106. Tabb, supra note 66; Hope & Patterson, supra note 66.
107. Angela Chen, Nasdaq Launches Lower Access Fee Program, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 
2015, 9:03 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-launches-lower-access-fee-program-
1422884966.
108. The exchanges named are the BATS Exchange, Inc., BATS Y-Exchange, Inc., Chi-
cago Stock Exchange, Inc., EDGA Exchange, Inc., EDGX Exchange, Inc., The Nasdaq Stock 
Market LLC, Nasdaq OMX BX, Nasdaq OMX Phlx, National Stock Exchange, Inc., New York 
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velop and file with the SEC “a national market system plan to im-
plement a pilot program that, among other things, would widen the 
quoting and trading increments for certain small capitalization 
stocks.”109 Known as the Tick Size Pilot Plan, this pilot analyzes the 
impact of wider tick sizes, or wider minimum quoting increments, for 
stocks of some smaller companies.110 Namely, it tests the effects of 
trading stocks in five-cent increments instead of current one-cent 
increments.111 On August 25, 2014, the exchanges and FINRA filed 
with the SEC a proposed one-year plan to implement the pilot, which 
was published for comment in the Federal Register on November 7, 
2014.112 The SEC modified several provisions of the plan, taking 
into account input from commenters, and approved an updated ver-
sion on May 6, 2015.113 The pilot is scheduled to start by May 6, 
2016 and will run for two years instead of one.114
The pilot divides stocks into a control group and three test 
groups, subjecting one test group to a trade-at rule.115 The trade-at 
rule in the initial version proposed by the exchanges and FINRA 
required ATSs to execute orders with significant price improvement, 
meaning either five cents greater than the current best bid and ask 
or at the midpoint of the best bid and ask.116
The trade-at rule in the finalized version prevents price match-
ing by a trading venue that is not quoting at the protected bid or of-
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority to Submit a Tick Size Pilot Plan, 79 Fed. Reg. 
36840, 36848 (June 30, 2014). 
109. Joint Industry Plans; Order Approving the National Market System Plan To Imple-
ment a Tick Size Pilot Program by BATS Exchange, Inc., BATS YExchange, Inc., Chicago 
Stock Exchange, Inc., EDGA Exchange, Inc., EDGX Exchange, Inc., Financial Industry Regu-
latory Authority, Inc., NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc., NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC, The Nasdaq Stock 
Market LLC, New York Stock Exchange LLC, NYSE MKT LLC, and NYSE Arca, Inc., as 
Modified by the Commission, for a Two-Year Period, 80 Fed. Reg. 27513, 27515 (May 13, 
2015) [hereinafter Tick Size Pilot Program].
110. Grant Vingoe et al., SEC Approves Tick Size Pilot to Assess Impact on Smaller 
Companies, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT: BLOG NETWORK (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.regulationtomorrow.com/us/sec-approves-tick-size-pilot-to-assess-impact-on-
smaller-companies/.
111. Kurane, supra note 105.
112. Tick Size Pilot Program, supra note 109, at 27514.
113. Id.
114. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Pilot to Assess Tick Size 
Impact for Smaller Companies (May 6, 2015) (on file at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-82.html). 
115. Tick Size Pilot Program, supra note 109, at 27517.
116. Ed Beeson, Wall Street Assails Tick-Size Study’s Dark Pool Treatment, LAW360 (Dec. 
23, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/607471/wall-street-assails-tick-size-study-
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fer.117 Price matching refers to the practice of firms who internalize 
customer orders and execute them at the best publicly available bid 
or offer price regardless of their own quotations.118 A protected bid 
or offer is defined in Rule 611 of Reg NMS as a quotation that is 
“immediately and automatically accessible and be the best bid or 
best offer of a national securities exchange or national securities 
association.”119 Thus, a trading venue cannot execute from its own 
reserves without first routing to venues with displayed quotations 
and taking out the shares at the displayed quotation.120 However, 
where a trading venue displays a protected bid or offer, it can price 
match up to the number of shares displayed at the protected 
price.121 Exceptions to the trade-at rule in the pilot include retail or-
ders with price improvement and block trades.122 Namely, retail or-
ders must have a price improvement of $0.005 more than the best 
protected bid or ask.123 Block trades are defined as orders with at 
least 5,000 shares or with at least $100,000 in market value.124
Although the approved pilot incorporates a trade-at rule, Ste-
phen Luparello, the SEC’s Director of Trading and Markets, has 
publicly stated that the pilot is not a test for the trade-at rule; instead, 
it includes a trade-at rule to provide “a more complete picture of the 
market.”125 In support, he further stated, “If we were trying to figure 
out trade-at, the illiquid end of the market would not be where we 
want to play.”126 Luparello’s statements, however, have not prevent-
ed proponents and critics from voicing their opinions on the trade-at 
117. Vingoe et al., supra note 110. 
118. Special Study: Payment for Order Flow and Internalization in the Options Markets,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ordpay.htm#PAYMENT.
119. Responses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 611 and Rule 610 of 
Regulation NMS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/nmsfaq610-11.htm (last updated June 8, 2007). 








125. Rob Tricchinelli, Gallagher Warns of Bond ‘Liquidity Cliff,’ Regulators Talk Trade-At, 
Algo Registration, BLOOMBERG BNA: SEC. REG. & L. REP. (Oct. 6, 2014); David Michaels & 
Sam Mamudi, Brokers Attack SEC’s Plan as Trojan Horse, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 10, 2014, 
6:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-11/brokers-attack-sec-s-plan-as-
trojan-horse-designed-to-hurt-them. 
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rule as some fear this rule might be proposed for the entire market if 
it proves successful in the pilot. In effect, the pilot has launched a 
debate over market structure. ICE, NYSE, and Nasdaq have voiced 
their support for a trade-at rule.127 In contrast, large brokers whose 
business benefits from off-exchange trading tend to voice opposition 
to the trade-at rule.128
The collaboration between NYSE and Nasdaq is uncommon 
since exchanges normally compete for market share.129 The in-
crease in off-exchange trading, however, has given them a common 
goal in the form of a trade-at rule, which would draw orders back to 
them.130 In support of a trade-at rule, exchange officials contend that 
ATSs take market share from exchanges by executing trades with 
minimal price improvement, often in fractions of a penny.131 Moreo-
ver, since dark venues do not publicize pre-trade information, they 
do not contribute to the price discovery process; thus, at a certain 
point, publicly posted prices may not be an accurate measure of the 
market’s interest.132 Accordingly, the trade-at rule in the pilot prefer-
ences displayed liquidity over non-displayed liquidity, pushing some 
orders to exchanges where they could aid in the price discovery 
process.133 Additionally, it encourages aggressive quoting, or quot-
ing at higher buy prices or lower sell prices, rather than passive 
price matching.134 Aggressive quoting can promote price competition 
and narrow spreads, ultimately lowering investors’ costs.135
In contrast, large brokers tend to oppose the trade-at rule be-
cause it would prevent them from internalizing certain orders or rout-
ing them to off-exchange venues.136 A trade-at rule would subject 
brokers to access fees by forcing them to route orders to exchang-
es.137 It would also prevent them from price matching unless they 
127. Michaels, supra note 16; Tricchinelli, supra note 125; Hope, supra note 16.




132. ANA AVRAMOVIC, CREDIT SUISSE, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE DARK? TRADING OFF-
EXCHANGE 1 (2012).
133. See Michaels, supra note 16.
134. Letter from Micah Hauptman, Fin. Serv. Couns., Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Brent 
Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 22, 2014). 
135. Id.
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display the best bid or offer.138 Such a requirement is particularly 
burdensome for dark pools, who do not reveal quotes.139 Moreover, 
a trade-at rule could limit the ability of ATSs to compete for trades, 
and, as a result, increase trading costs that would be passed down 
to investors.140
B. The “Grand Bargain”
In late 2014, Jeff Sprecher, the Chief Executive of ICE, publicly 
presented a proposal for a “grand bargain” between exchanges and 
Wall Street banks.141 Under the proposal, exchanges lower access 
fees from thirty cents per 100 shares to five cents per 100 shares, 
and, in exchange, banks accept the trade-at rule.142 The proposal 
encourages banks to trade on exchanges by making it less expen-
sive to do so. For instance, with lower access fees, a broker has 
less incentive to avoid routing orders to exchanges.143
Another key feature of the grand bargain is to eliminate maker-
taker pricing.144 As mentioned above, in a maker-taker system, mar-
ket participants that respond to buy or sell orders “take” liquidity and 
pay a fee for access.145 Market participants that post orders that are 
not immediately executable “provide” liquidity and receive re-
bates.146 Thus, eliminating the maker-taker model means prohibiting 
trading venues from having different fees and rebates for “takers” 
and “makers” of liquidity.147
Although no tests are scheduled for this program yet, it has 
gained support from several industry participants.148 Again, ICE, 
138. Letter from James P. Selway III, Managing Dir. and Head of Electronic Brokerage, 
ITG Inc., to Brent Fields, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 5, 2015) (on file at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-657/4657-91.pdf). 
139. Id.
140. Ed Beeson, Wall Street Assails Tick-Size Study’s Dark Pool Treatment, LAW360 
(Dec. 23, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/607471/wall-street-assails-tick-size-
study-s-dark-pool-treatment.
141. Tabb, supra note 66; Hope & Patterson, supra note 66.
142. Hope & Patterson, supra note 66.
143. Tabb, supra note 66. 
144. ICE’s Six Recommendations for Reforming Markets, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (Dec. 
18, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/12/18/ices-six-recommendations-
for-reforming-markets/ [hereinafter ICE’s Six Recommendations]. 
145. Id.
146. Id.; Bob Pisani, Wall Street Trade Group Urges New Trading Rules, CNBC (July 14, 
2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101834667. 
147. ICE’s Six Recommendations, supra note 144.
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NYSE, and Nasdaq have publicly voiced support for the grand bar-
gain.149 Naturally, exchanges support a program that aims to bring 
order flow to them. This program, however, has the potential to cut 
into the revenue of exchanges through decreased access fees. De-
creased rebates can also disincentivize market participants from 
posting orders on exchanges. Nevertheless, the grand bargain ar-
gues that reduced access fees in combination with a trade-at rule 
provide sufficient incentive to draw order flow to exchanges.150
In addition to exchanges, various industry participants support 
ICE’s grand bargain. First, the grand bargain decreases access fees 
and makes routing to exchanges less expensive, which wins support 
from many broker-dealers who want to avoid access fees.151 Moreo-
ver, it exempts block trades from the trade-at requirement; therefore, 
industry participants whose business focuses on block trades face 
less impact. Indeed, the head of market structure of Liquidnet Hold-
ings LLC, a dark-pool operator whose focus is block trades, voiced 
support for the proposal.152 Further, the grand bargain can benefit 
those on the buy-side of the industry by diminishing conflicts of in-
terest through the elimination of the maker-taker model. Banning 
maker-taker means there is less incentive to route to ATSs over 
exchanges, which diminishes conflicts of interest in the routing pro-
cess.153
Interestingly, Credit Suisse, which operates the largest dark 
pool, supports this proposal.154 Credit Suisse’s motivation for sup-
porting the grand bargain is unclear, although it may signify that the 
regulatory scrutiny and expense of operating a dark pool are becom-
ing too costly. Nevertheless, Credit Suisse’s support bolsters ICE’s 
proposal and may encourage support from other industry partici-
pants.
In contrast, other market participants voice opposition to the 
grand bargain, fearing it will harm investors. BATS’ former CEO, 
Joseph Ratterman, stated the plan was “‘highly problematic’ and 
149. Matt Levine, NYSE’s Grand Bargain Just Might Work: Matt Levine, TRADERS MAG.
(Dec. 23, 2014), http://repubhub.icopyright.net/freePost.act?tag=3.8154?icx_id=113276.
150. ICE’s Six Recommendations, supra note 144.
151. Deconstructing the ‘Grand Bargain’, MARKETS MEDIA (Feb. 6, 2015), 
http://marketsmedia.com/deconstructing-grand-bargain/.
152. Bradley Hope, ICE Has Unlikely Ally on Trading Proposal, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 
2014, 7:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ice-has-unlikely-ally-on-trading-proposal-
1419208856.
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would ‘hurt’ investors by increasing costs and reducing options for 
trading.”155 The fear is that such a proposal will make trading more 
expensive by driving order flow to exchanges and forcing brokers to 
forego less expensive internalizations. Further, wholesalers repre-
sent a group that potentially stands to lose from the grand bar-
gain.156 Most of the orders that wholesalers execute are matched 
from within their inventory; therefore, wholesalers may be impacted 
by a trade-at rule that preferences trading on exchanges.157 In fact, 
KCG Holdings Inc., which has a wholesale business, stated that 
“forcing more trading onto exchanges was an ‘elephant-gun ap-
proach motivated by commercial interests of a handful of market 
participants.’”158
C. Nasdaq’s Decreased Access Fee Program
Instead of using a trade-at rule to reduce off-exchange trading, 
some market participants argue that reducing access fees is an ef-
fective means of driving order flow to exchanges. In February 2015, 
Nasdaq began a program testing the effects of decreased access 
fees on off-exchange stock trading.159 Although various news 
sources have cited Nasdaq as a proponent of the trade-at rule, its 
program lacks a trade-at requirement. 160 The program is set to run 
for a minimum of four months, and it lowers the cap on access fees 
from the current thirty cents per 100 shares to five cents per 100 
shares for fourteen stocks.161 Nasdaq also lowers rebates to less 
than five cents per 100 shares for these fourteen stocks.162 Nasdaq 
chose stocks that tend to trade in off-exchange venues at a higher-
than-average rate.163 Through this program, Nasdaq plans to evalu-
ate the effect of decreasing access fees on off-exchange trading, 
price discovery, trading costs, and liquidity.164
155. Hope, supra note 61. 
156. Hope, supra note 152. 
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Chen, supra note 107. 
160. Id.
161. Id.







      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 222 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
14 ZYSKIND FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2015 11:35 AM
430 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
Nasdaq is acting without the support of other exchanges in im-
plementing this program.165 However, the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), the largest securities indus-
try trade group that represents asset managers and brokerage firms, 
has voiced support for a decrease in access fees.166 Similar to 
Nasdaq, SIFMA supports a reduction of the cap on access fees from 
thirty cents to five cents per 100 shares.167 It contends that such a 
reduction will make trading on exchanges less expensive and drive 
more orders to exchanges.168 Although this proposal may not be in 
the best interest of SIFMA members who own dark pools, most 
SIFMA members are not dark pool owners.169
While not directly responding to Nasdaq’s pilot, Citigroup, a 
large global bank with broker-dealer subsidiaries, submitted a com-
ment to the SEC in support of a reduction in access fees without a 
trade-at rule.170 Citigroup called the trade-at rule a “sledgehammer 
approach,” arguing that a reduction in access fees would naturally 
draw more orders to exchanges.171 Citigroup suggested different 
access fees based on different variables such as the price, volume, 
or market capitalization of a security.172
Others market participants, however, contend that decreased 
access are not enough to naturally shift order flow to exchanges.  
Instead, there is a fear that lowering the cap on access fees will de-
crease liquidity on exchanges.173 Because decreased access fees 
translate into decreased rebates, liquidity providers may leave ex-
changes for venues with higher rebates.174
Moreover, although SIFMA supports the idea behind Nasdaq’s 
proposal to decrease access fees, it questions the validity of the 
165. Id.
166. Pisani, supra note 75; Jed Horowitz, Trade Group SIFMA Names Ex-Senator Gregg 
as CEO, REUTERS (May 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/20/us-sifma-gregg-
idUSBRE94J0TX20130520.
167. Pisani, supra note 75.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Letter from Daniel Keegan, Managing Dir., Head of Equities for the Americas, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Aug. 7, 2014).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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data derived from the program.175 Namely, because the decrease in 
access fees only applies to transactions on Nasdaq, SIFMA does 
not view the program as an accurate indicator of the effects of de-
creased access fees on the entire market.176 SIFMA also argues 
that it is impossible to separate access fees from other variables that 
encourage market participants to post or remove liquidity for the 
subject fourteen stocks.177
D. BATS Exclusive Listings Proposal
BATS filed the “BATS Exclusive Listings Proposal” on May 5, 
2015 with the SEC, aiming to improve trading in thinly-traded securi-
ties.178 Thinly-traded stocks are illiquid and thus tend to have low 
trading volumes, limited numbers of interested buyers and sellers, 
wider bid-ask spreads, and higher transaction costs.179 In contrast, 
liquid stocks tend to have high trading volumes, larger numbers of 
interested buyers and sellers, narrower bid-ask spreads, and lower 
transaction costs.180 BATS’ proposal aims to focus displayed liquidi-
ty in thinly-traded stocks at one venue to “enable market participants 
to more efficiently form prices” and to enable that venue to “be better 
able to innovate [its] markets specifically for thinly-traded stocks.”181
Accordingly, BATS would not offer trading in thinly-traded stocks; 
instead, these stocks would trade on the exchange where they are 
primarily listed.182 BATS’ proposal applies to stocks whose average 
daily trading volume (ADV) is lower than 2,500 shares, which means 
the proposal would include about 700 stocks.183
BATS is not a proponent of the trade-at rule, deeming it disrup-
tive to U.S. market structure; however, it refers to this Exclusive List-
175. Letter from Theodore R. Lazo, Managing Dir. and Assoc. Gen. Couns., Sec. Indus. & 




178. BATS EXCH., BATS FILES EXCLUSIVE LISTINGS PROPOSAL (2015), 
http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/press_releases/BATS-Exclusive-Listings-FINAL.pdf.
179. See Illiquid Definition, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/i/illiquid 
(last visited July 7, 2015).
180. See Liquidity Definition, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/l/liquidity (last visited July 3, 2015). 
181. BATS EXCH., supra note 178.
182. Nicole Bullock, Bats Wants to Remove Illiquid Stocks from its Exchanges, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 9, 2015, 11:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/66d037fc-df06-11e4-b9ec-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3eqCvR7R4.
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ings Proposal as a “non-disruptive modification to U.S. equity market 
structure that BATS, other exchanges and the industry at large can 
implement with very little technical impact to the industry and its 
many participants.”184 Those in favor of BATS’ proposal praise it as 
an “incremental change” that will not significantly disrupt market 
structure.185 They argue that concentrating liquidity, instead of dis-
persing it among various venues in a fragmented market, will in-
crease price discovery and decrease transaction costs.186
However, critics argue that without the other exchanges or dark 
pools partaking in this proposal, unilateral action by BATS will be 
ineffective.187 Although BATS hopes that other venues will follow, an 
SEC rule is necessary to force other venues to comply.188 In addi-
tion, because the proposal does not discuss internalization and 
lacks a trade-at rule, internalizing market makers, or trading firms 
that fill investors’ orders from their own inventories rather than route 
them to exchanges, could still trade the illiquid stocks in BATS’ pro-
posal.189 Namely, internalizing market makers could offer minimal 
price improvement, as low as fractions of a penny, and jump ahead 
of displayed liquidity.190 For instance, the bid and offer of an illiquid 
stock stands at $10.00 and $10.20, respectively, and an investor
posts an order to buy 500 shares at a price of $10.05 or better.191
The bid and offer, respectively, are now at $10.05 and $10.20, and 
an investor places an order to sell 500 shares immediately at the 
best price available; an internalizing market maker can still jump 
ahead of the $10.05 displayed bid and buy the stock for 
$10.05001.192 Here, the individual who narrowed the spread by mov-
ing the bid from $10.00 to $10.05 and contributed to the price dis-
covery process was disadvantaged by the internalizing market
184. Id.; Bullock, supra note 182.
185. BATS’ Exclusive Listing Proposal a Reasonable and Cautious Step, TABB FORUM
(Apr. 17, 2015), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/bats’-exclusive-listing-proposal-a-reasonable-
and-cautious-step.
186. Id.
187. Some Questions About the BATs Exclusive Listing Proposal, THEMIS TRADING BLOG
(Apr. 15, 2015), http://blog.themistrading.com/2015/04/some-questions-about-the-bats-
exclusive-listing-proposal// [hereinafter Some Questions].
188. Id.
189. Id.; Matt Levine, Who Cares What Apple’s Stock Price Is?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 
25, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-25/who-cares-what-
apple-s-stock-price-is. 
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maker who jumped ahead of his order.193 This internalization issue 
questions the effectiveness of BATS’ proposal.
E. No Trade-at Rule
Finally, certain market participants oppose the trade-at rule and 
argue that off-exchange trading has not reached a point where it is 
harmful to investors and overall market quality. Managing director 
Justin Schack of Rosenblatt Securities Inc., an institutional broker 
that buys and sells stock for institutional investors, argues that re-
search has not proven that increased off-exchange trading is 
“measurably harming market quality” and that “[t]here is no guaran-
tee we wind up in a better place” with a trade-at rule.194 Additionally, 
Larry Harris, a former chief economist at the SEC who now sits on 
the board of a brokerage firm, made a similar point.195 He contends 
that there is insufficient evidence showing that the amount of dark 
trading harms market quality.196 In support, he states that transac-
tion costs have decreased since 2004.197 According to Harris, “ex-
changes are hurting in the sense that their market share is dropping 
off, but the overall quality of the prices has not dramatically fallen 
off.”198
Moreover, other participants argue a trade-at rule will harm in-
vestors by forcing order flow to exchanges. Executives from Morgan 
Stanley called the trade-at rule an “over-reaction,” arguing that it 
takes away valuable options for customers looking to execute orders 
at off-exchange venues.199 The founder and CEO of TABB Group, a 
research firm, argues that the trade-at rule will “benefit few and harm 
many.”200 He maintains that it has the potential to harm investors by 
forcing transactions out of dark pools and onto exchanges.201 Such
193. Id.
194. David Michaels, Stock Exchanges Seek Curbs on Dark Pools to Fight Exodus,







200. Market Structure Expert, TABB Group CEO Larry Tabb Focuses on the “Trade-At Rule” and “Tick 
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a scenario can be detrimental to investors by enabling high-
frequency traders to detect sizeable orders and front-run them. He 
also argues that a trade-at rule can increase trading costs by forcing 
brokers to give up less expensive internal executions.202 Another 
industry participant, KCG Holdings, argues that the trade-at rule is 
“motivated by commercial interests of a handful of market partici-
pants.”203
F. Canada and Australia’s Trade-At Rules
Both Canada and Australia have recently implemented trade-at 
rules, which have led to increased costs and minimal benefits. Can-
ada implemented a trade-at rule in October 2012. At the time of en-
actment, Canada’s market already had a similar price-improvement 
rule in place that prohibited internalization without price improve-
ment.204 The 2012 trade-at rule expanded the prior rule to cover 
dark pools and mandated that they provide meaningful price im-
provement.205
Canada’s trade-at rule was successful in decreasing the 
amount of trading in dark pools; however, it failed to decrease trad-
ing costs and increase order posting in lit markets. For instance, the 
market experienced a decline of twenty percent in dark trading vol-
ume.206 However, investors were not more likely to post orders in lit 
markets, like exchanges, under the new trade-at regime.207 Addi-
tionally, bid-ask spreads widened after the trade-at rule’s adoption, 
which signals increased trading costs.208
Similarly, in May 2013, Australia introduced a trade-at rule to its 
dark markets, forcing dark venues to provide price improvement or 
send orders elsewhere.209 The effects of the trade-at rule in Austral-
ia were similar to those in Canada. After the rule was adopted, Aus-
tralian markets experienced a decrease in dark volume.210 However, 
spreads widened, indicating more expensive trading costs.211 Again, 
202. Id.
203. Hope, supra note 152.





209. Id. at 3.
210. Id.
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the trade-at rule did not encourage the posting of liquidity in lit mar-
kets.212 Thus, the trade-at rules implemented in Canada and Austral-
ia led to a decrease in off-exchange trading with minimal 
improvement to market quality.213
While the effects on Australia and Canada’s markets are note-
worthy, it is important to consider that these markets differ signifi-
cantly from the U.S. market. The U.S. has the largest stock market 
in the world.214 Canada and Australia are not close behind. As of 
2014, the NYSE had a market capitalization of about $21 trillion and 
Nasdaq had a market capitalization of about $7 trillion.215 In con-
trast, Canada’s TMX group had a market capitalization slightly over 
$2 trillion in 2014.216 Meanwhile, the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) had a market capitalization of $1.5 trillion.217 Thus, there is no 
direct comparison between the U.S. and Canada or Australia’s mar-
ket.
Nevertheless, the effects of the trade-at rule in Canada and 
Australia provide valuable guidance for the U.S. in deciding whether 
to implement a trade-at rule. Specifically, if a trade-at rule makes 
trading more expensive by widening bid-ask spreads and fails to 
draw more liquidity to exchanges, market structure is likely better 
without such a rule.
III. THE MOST PROMISING PROPOSAL
While it can be easy to find fault with the market, it is worth not-
ing that market quality has improved. Research shows that investors 
fare better in today’s fragmented stock market dominated by com-
puter algorithms.218 For example, despite the prevalence of HFT, 
institutional investors enjoyed ten percent lower execution costs in 
2013 than in 2006.219 Transaction costs have fallen significantly 
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Stock Market, BLOOMBERG Bus. 
(Nov. 27, 2014, 7:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-27/china-
surpasses-japan-as-world-s-second-biggest-equity-market. 
215. Andy Kiersz, The NYSE Makes Stock Exchanges Around the World Look Tiny, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/global-stock-market-
capitalization-chart-2014-11. 
216. Id.
217. ASX Corporate Overview, ASX, http://www.asx.com.au/about/corporate-overview.htm 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
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since 2004.220 Bid-ask spreads are also as narrow as ever for the 
market as a whole.221 These statistics show that today’s market 
structure is not failing investors but allowing them to earn more from 
their trades as a whole.
Nonetheless, problems including conflicts of interest associated 
with maker-taker and lack of price discovery persist in today’s mar-
ket. Trading costs may have decreased for investors overall but 
there is potential for some market participants to benefit at the ex-
pense of others. For instance, brokers may benefit from off-
exchange trading by internalizing or routing orders based on fees 
and rebates and copying publicly-available prices without contrib-
uting to price discovery.
Thus, a combination of factors taken from the proposals above 
has the most potential to remedy issues associated with off-
exchange trading. This article advocates for a combination of a 
trade-at rule, decreased cap on access fees, a variable access fee
and rebate schedule, and a block trading exemption. Such a pro-
posal is most promising because it reduces the conflicts of interest 
that brokers face, assuages the concern that brokers are subject to 
unnecessary access fees, reduces information leakage, and pro-
motes the price discovery process.
First, the trade-at rule in the finalized Tick Size Pilot has the po-
tential to preference displayed liquidity.222 Under this requirement, a
trading venue cannot execute from its own reserves without first 
routing to venues with displayed quotations and taking out the 
shares at the displayed quotation.223 Accordingly, such a version of 
the trade-at rule preferences displayed liquidity over non-displayed 
liquidity, pushing orders to displayed market centers—such as ex-
changes—where they can aid in the price discovery process.224 Ad-
ditionally, it encourages aggressive quoting over passive price 
matching, which can promote price competition and narrow 
spreads.225 Moreover, a trading venue displaying a protected quote 
220. Michaels, supra note 195.
221. White, supra note 95.
222. Vingoe et al., supra note 110.




224. See Michaels, supra note 16.
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can price match up to the number of shares displayed at the pro-
tected price.226 Thus, ATSs can avoid trade-at routing obligations by 
posting displayed, protected quotes and contributing to price discov-
ery.
Second, the combination of the aforementioned trade-at rule 
with decreased access fees ensures that a trade-at rule does not 
subject brokers to costly fees while encouraging order flow to ex-
changes. Although a trade-at rule forces brokers to avoid certain 
internal executions or off-exchange venues, it allows them to access 
exchange liquidity at a lower cost. Thus, reduced access fees en-
courage brokers to execute on exchanges while ensuring that the 
cost of foregone internalization or off-exchange execution is less 
burdensome. Additionally, although decreased rebates could shift 
orders away from exchanges, a trade-at rule in conjunction with de-
ceased rebates is likely to shift order flow back to exchanges.
Indeed, implementing a combination of a trade-at rule and de-
creased cap on access fees is more efficient than implementing 
each measure alone. Decreased access fees alone may not draw 
trades to exchanges. Although brokers have less incentive to avoid 
exchanges with reduced access fees, reduced access fees alone 
may not stop participants from sending orders to off-exchange ven-
ues with even lower fees or higher rebates. Alternatively, a trade-at 
rule without decreased access fees could increase trading costs by 
forcing brokers to avoid less expensive execution venues. Brokers 
are also likely to pass on such costs to investors.
Third, a reduction in access fees and rebates reduces conflicts 
of interest for brokers. If access fees or rebates motivate a broker’s 
choice in order execution venues, a broker may not act in the client’s 
best interest.227 In cases where brokers favor their own interest over 
the customers’, customers face decreased execution quality.228 De-
creasing access fees and rebates would decrease conflicts of inter-
est by giving brokers less incentive to avoid exchanges and to 
preference internalization or ATSs. Although prohibiting the maker-
taker system would further remove such conflicts of interest, this 
proposal advises lowering fees and rebates to study the impact on 
the market before eliminating maker-taker.
226. Vingoe et al., supra note 110. 
227. Senate PSI Hearing, supra note 7, at 1.
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Fourth, imposing a variable access fee and rebate schedule on 
different securities ensures that access fees and rebates drive or-
ders to exchanges. Given the number of variables at play in the 
market, it is likely that trading in certain stocks is not motivated by 
access fees or rebates. In such cases, altering access fees and re-
bates will have little influence on a broker’s decision to send orders 
to an exchange. However, access fees and rebates may play more 
of a pivotal role in trading less liquid stocks.229 Thus, a variable ac-
cess fee and rebate schedule, which depends on the characteristics 
of specific securities, is likely to have more success in moving order 
flow to exchanges. 
Fifth, an exception to the trade-at rule for block trading in dark 
pools benefits institutional investors that seek to avoid front-running 
by high-frequency traders. Dark pools are valuable to institutional 
investors because they allow institutional investors to avoid alerting 
high-frequency traders of their orders.230 Thus, an exception for 
block trading allows institutional investors to take advantage of the 
benefits of dark pools. Moreover, forcing some block trades out of 
dark pools and onto public exchanges places them at risk of infor-
mation leakage, meaning that high-frequency traders can more easi-
ly detect a large order and front-run it. Thus, an exception for block 
trading would allow institutional investors to avoid information leak-
age and enjoy the benefits of dark pools.
Moreover, this exception balances the need for anonymity with 
the need for price discovery. Dark pools do not contribute to price 
discovery because they do not publicize pre-trade information.231
So, publicly posted prices may not be an accurate measure of the 
market’s interest if a significant amount of trading takes places in 
dark pools.232 Exempting block trades rather than all dark trading 
can aid the price discovery process by forcing more orders to ex-
changes without harming institutional investors.
Although BATS’ proposal is less costly and complex than the 
trade-at rule, it concentrates on thinly traded stocks and does not 
deal with internalizing market makers. While the issues surrounding 
price discovery, transaction costs, bid-ask spreads, and liquidity may 
be amplified for thinly traded stocks, they are not unique to them. A
229. Keegan, supra note 170.
230. SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 51. 
231. AVRAMOVIC, supra note 97, at 1.
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trade-at rule aims to tackle these issues across liquid and illiquid 
stocks. Further, without a trade-at rule, internalizing market makers 
can still trade illiquid stocks and, therefore, jeopardize the effective-
ness of BATS’ proposal.233 Internalizing market makers that jump 
ahead of displayed liquidity and offer minimal price improvement 
disadvantage investors who contribute to price discovery.234 As 
aforementioned, an internalizing market maker can jump ahead of a 
displayed $10.05 bid to buy a stock for $10.05001, offering minimal 
price improvement, while disadvantaging the investor that contribut-
ed to price discovery.235 Given that as of March 2013, internalization 
has made up about sixty percent of off-exchange trading, BATS’ 
proposal has the potential to exclude a significant amount of trad-
ing.236
IV. METRICS FOR SUCCESS
Both positive and negative effects can be linked to almost any 
program. Often, market participants’ positions in the industry deter-
mine whether they view the effects as positive or negative. Thus, the 
relevant question is whether the market is more efficient with or 
without a trade-at rule targeted to decrease off-exchange trading. 
This determination can best be done by studying empirical evidence,
namely the data from the aforementioned programs. Regulators can 
effectively use such data to determine whether a program will in-
crease market quality and should be implemented. This article pro-
poses regulators look to market share, bid-ask spreads, and price as 
measures of market quality.237
First, market share is a useful indicator to determine whether 
the trade-at rule achieves its goal of decreasing off-exchange trad-
ing and improving price discovery. Specifically, as mentioned above, 
dark trading impairs the price discovery process. Thus, it is useful to 
measure whether dark trading decreases with the implementation of 
the trade-at rule. To prove useful, the trade-at rule must push some 
dark trading to lit markets where it can contribute to price discovery. 
233. Some Questions, supra note 188.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Nathaniel Popper, As Market Heats Up, Trading Slips into Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/business/as-market-heats-up-trading-slips-
into-shadows.html?_r=0.
237. See Letter from Larry Tabb, Founder & CEO, TABB Group, to Elizabeth Murphy, U.S. 
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If dark trading decreases but does not shift to lit markets, the situa-
tion in the U.S. begins to resemble that of Canada and Australia
after the implementation of the trade-at rule. If dark trading does not 
shift to lit venues, the market may experience less overall trading 
volume. Such a scenario can subject investors to high price impact
when trading.238 Investors prefer high trading volume, where it is 
relatively easy to buy or sell a security, because a trade will have a 
relatively minor impact on the stock price.239 In contrast, when there 
is less opportunity for orders to interact, investors face higher price 
impact because variations in supply and demand can move the 
market.240
Second, bid-ask spreads are a useful measure of the success 
of a trade-at rule. If stocks subject to a trade-at rule experience wid-
er spreads, a trade-at rule makes the market less efficient. Investors 
prefer narrow spreads to wide spreads. Wide spreads signify that 
trading has become more expensive and buyers and sellers have to 
concede more to enter or exit trades.241 Accordingly, stocks with 
narrow spreads are easier to trade since investors can generally 
agree on the price.
Third, prices are an effective metric in determining whether the 
market is better with a trade-at rule. Evaluating prices allows regula-
tors to measure whether investors receive better executions under a 
trade-at regime. For instance, if orders begin to execute at the mid-
point of the best bid and ask prices under a trade-at rule, investors 
may receive less price improvement. Additionally, if the trade-at rule 
forces brokers to forego lower cost internal executions or higher 
rebate venues, they may pass along excess costs to investors. 
Thus, price serves as a useful indicator of how much investors gain 
or lose as a result of the trade-at rule. Therefore, market share, bid-
ask spreads, and price are valuable measures in determining 
whether a trade-at rule has benefitted investors in the market.
Further, if implementing a program with a variable fee schedule, 
it is worthwhile to determine which stocks are motivated by access 
fees and rebates. Thus, appropriate fees can be implemented in 
conjunction with a trade-at rule to decrease brokers’ costs and en-
courage more liquidity to exchanges. Regulators should pay special 
238. J. P. BOUCHAUD, PRICE IMPACT 1–2 (2009), http://arxiv.org/pdf/0903.2428.pdf.
239. Id.
240. Beny, supra note 99, at 419. 
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attention to stocks with unusually high levels of off-exchange trading 
activity to determine whether a certain level of access fee or rebate 
can influence their trading activity.
Therefore, evaluating a program’s effects on market share, bid-
ask spreads, and price will test whether the market is more efficient 
under a trade-at rule. Because industry participants have different 
motivations, these metrics provide more objective indicators of mar-
ket quality to determine whether the market is more efficient with a
trade-at rule.
CONCLUSION
Off-exchange trading accounts for a significant amount of the 
market. Currently, forty percent of stock trading occurs in off-
exchange venues. While off-exchange trading can lower transaction 
costs and offer price improvement, it can also pose conflicts of inter-
est and harm price discovery. Therefore, this article advocates for 
the implementation of a program that incorporates a trade-at rule, 
decreased cap on access fees, variable access fee and rebate 
schedule, and an exemption for block trades as a solution to the 
negative effects associated with off-exchange trading. Empirical 
evidence is crucial in measuring the success of this program. Ac-
cordingly, this article suggests measuring market share, bid-ask 
spreads, and price to determine whether the current market is more 
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